Does Indiana's statute of limitations allow the discovery rule?

According to Study v. State 24 N.E.3d 947, (2015), the discovery rule does not always apply to Indiana's criminal statutes of limitations.

Some courts with appellate jurisdiction in Indiana have time barred criminal complaints based on lack of concealment, holding that a defendant must conceal the crime itself, not the defendant's guilt. Other common law has held that concealment must be a positive act of concealment, rather than a passive one. However, once concealment is established, the statute sometimes tolls until the State has sufficient evidence to charge the defendant.

Since 1976, Indiana's legislature has amended its statute of limitations to use broader language. However, the courts have not assigned any significance to the changes. A footnote in Gilliland v. State reads:

Indiana Code section 35–41–4–2(h)(2) uses the language “conceals evidence of the offense,” which is seemingly broader than its predecessor's language, “conceals the fact that the offense has been committed.” See Ind.Code § 35–1–3–5 (1976). We note that decisions from the Court of Appeals have not assigned significance to this change and continue to analyze concealment as courts did under the now-defunct section 35–1–3–5: to constitute concealment, “there must be a positive act performed by the defendant calculated to prevent discovery of the fact that a crime has been committed.” Sipe v. State, 797 N.E.2d 336, 340 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); e.g., Kifer v. State, 740 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind.Ct.App.2000). It is arguable that the new language applies to concealment of any evidence, including evidence of guilt, and thus would toll the statute of limitations in any crime in which a defendant tries to avoid apprehension. Because concealment is not an issue in this case, we leave this question for another day. 947 N.E.2d at 922 n. 8. Because Gilliland concealed the fact that the offenses at issue had been committed, and not just evidence of his guilt, we also leave this question for another day.

Gilliland v. State is a case regarding the mandatory reporting law I wrote about in other posts. The following cases are clear about a person's duty to report child abuse. The courts have held the failure to report is a positive act of concealment. Gilliland v. State, 979 N.E.2d 1049, (2012). You might also want to check out Lebo v. State, 977 N.E.2d 1031, (2012).

I feel like the holding in Study vs. State was issued from a standpoint of judicial laziness, not from legislative intent or even textualism. In light of these holdings and dicta, can Mr. White still face criminal charges for failing to report the abuse at INPACT?

Periods of Limitations IN Code § 35-41-4-2 (2025)

(h) The period within which a prosecution must be commenced does not include any period in which:

(1) the accused person is not usually and publicly resident in Indiana or so conceals himself or herself that process cannot be served;

(2) the accused person conceals evidence of the offense, and evidence sufficient to charge the person with that offense is unknown to the prosecuting authority and could not have been discovered by that authority by exercise of due diligence; or

(3) the accused person is a person elected or appointed to office under statute or constitution, if the offense charged is theft or conversion of public funds or bribery while in public office.